Kelvin Measurement can certainly achieve some independence of perspective. Measurement instruments interact with the environment, and so results will always be a product of both the properties of the environment we aim to measure as well as the properties of the instrument. Instruments, thus, provide a perspectival view on the world cf.
Giere Moreover, making sense of measurement results requires interpretation. Consider temperature measurement. It was argued, eventually, that if a thermometer was to be reliable, different tokens of the same thermometer type should agree with each other, and the results of air thermometers agreed the most.
Moreover, the procedure yielded at best a reliable instrument, not necessarily one that was best at tracking the uniquely real temperature if there is such a thing. What Chang argues about early thermometry is true of measurement more generally.
Measurements are always made against a backdrop of metaphysical presuppositions, theoretical expectations and other kinds of belief. Whether or not any given procedure is regarded as adequate depends to a large extent on the purposes pursued by the individual scientist or group of scientists making the measurements. Especially in the social sciences, this often means that measurement procedures are laden with normative assumptions, i.
Julian Reiss , has argued that economic indicators such as consumer price inflation, gross domestic product and the unemployment rate are value-laden in this sense. Consumer-price indices, for instance, assume that if a consumer prefers a bundle x over an alternative y , then x is better for her than y , which is as ethically charged as it is controversial.
National income measures assume that nations that exchange a larger share of goods and services on markets are richer than nations where the same goods and services are provided by the government, which too is as ethically charged and controversial. While not free of assumptions and values, the goal of many measurement procedures remains to reduce the influence of personal biases and idiosyncrasies. The Nixon administration, famously, indexed social security payments to the consumer-price index in order to eliminate the dependence of security recipients on the flimsiest of party politics: to make increases automatic instead of a result of political negotiations Nixon Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison refer to this as mechanical objectivity.
Finally, we come to the full-fledged establishment of mechanical objectivity as the ideal of scientific representation. What we find is that the image, as standard bearer of is objectivity is tied to a relentless search to replace individual volition and discretion in depiction by the invariable routines of mechanical reproduction. Daston and Galison In truth I am no more than an automaton that registers, without judgment and as exactly as possible, the dictate of my subconscious: my dreams, hypnagogic images and visions, and all the concrete and irrational manifestations of the dark and sensational world discovered by Freud.
Mechanical objectivity reduces the importance of human contributions to scientific results to a minimum, and therefore enables science to proceed on a large scale where bonds of trust between individuals can no longer hold Daston Trust in mechanical procedures thus replaces trust in individual scientists. In his book Trust in Numbers , Theodore Porter pursues this line of thought in great detail.
In particular, on the basis of case studies involving British actuaries in the mid-nineteenth century, of French state engineers throughout the century, and of the US Army Corps of Engineers from to , he argues for two causal claims. First, measurement instruments and quantitative procedures originate in commercial and administrative needs and affect the ways in which the natural and social sciences are practiced, not the other way around.
http://mx13.profession70476.tokyo/2587.php The mushrooming of instruments such as chemical balances, barometers, chronometers was largely a result of social pressures and the demands of democratic societies. Second, he argues that quantification is a technology of distrust and weakness, and not of strength. It is weak administrators who do not have the social status, political support or professional solidarity to defend their experts' judgments.
They therefore subject decisions to public scrutiny, which means that they must be made in a publicly accessible form. The National Academy of Sciences has accepted the principle that scientists should declare their conflicts of interest and financial holdings before offering policy advice, or even information to the government.
And while police inspections of notebooks remain exceptional, the personal and financial interests of scientists and engineers are often considered material, especially in legal and regulatory contexts. Strategies of impersonality must be understood partly as defenses against such suspicions […].
Objectivity means knowledge that does not depend too much on the particular individuals who author it. Porter Measurement and quantification help to reduce the influence of personal biases and idiosyncrasies and they reduce the need to trust the scientist or government official, but often at a cost. Standardizing scientific procedures becomes difficult when their subject matters are not homogeneous, and few domains outside fundamental physics are.
Attempts to quantify procedures for treatment and policy decisions that we find in evidence-based practices are currently transferred to a variety of sciences such as medicine, nursing, psychology, education and social policy. However, they often lack a certain degree of responsiveness to the peculiarities of their subjects and the local conditions to which they are applied see also section 5.
Moreover, the measurement and quantification of characteristics of scientific interest is only half of the story.
We also want to describe relations between the quantities and make inferences using statistical analysis. Statistics thus helps to quantify further aspects of scientific work. We will now turn to the question whether or not statistical analysis can proceed in a way free from personal biases and idiosyncrasies.
Objectivity definition is - the quality or character of being objective: lack of favoritism toward one side or another: freedom from bias. How to use objectivity in a. Objectivity is a philosophical concept of being true independently from individual subjectivity caused by perception, emotions, or imagination. A proposition is.
The appraisal of scientific evidence is traditionally regarded as a domain of scientific reasoning where the ideal of scientific objectivity has strong normative force, and where it is also well-entrenched in scientific practice. Episodes such as Galilei's observations of the Jupiter moons, Lavoisier's calcination experiments, and Eddington's observation of the eclipse are found in all philosophy of science textbooks because they exemplify how evidence can be persuasive and compelling to scientists with different backgrounds.
Inferential statistics—the field that investigates the validity of inferences from data to theory—tries to answer this question. It is extremely influential in modern science. In section 3. Carnap is interested in determining the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis relative to a given set of observations. In other words, the degree of confirmation of hypothesis H relative to E is the conditional probability of H given E. But is this probability an objective quantity and free from personal bias?
Not all are equally suited: for example, assigning equal weight to all complete state descriptions would not allow for learning from experience.
Magnus and J. We create Win-Win solutions for all our stakeholders. In such contexts, it is often necessary to accept or to reject a hypothesis e. An example of such will be categorical imperative philosophy by Immanuel Kant , which coined the following: "Act only according to that maxim [i. By region Related lists Miscellaneous. University of California, San Diego.
But these comments miss the point: they neglect the subjective choices on which the inductive inferences are built. Carnap's approach is objective in so far as the degree of confirmation is intersubjectively compelling once a logical language and appropriate symmetry principles for this language are agreed upon; however, it is subjective in the sense that rational agents may disagree on these principles. See also the entry on inductive logic.
Closely related to Carnap's logical probability framework is the Bayesian approach to confirmation and evidence, developed first by Frank Ramsey. It is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degrees of belief in a particular hypothesis. These degrees of belief are changed by conditionalization on observed evidence E and making use of Bayes' Theorem :.
These days, the Bayesian approach is extremely influential in philosophy, but also in scientific disciplines such as statistics, economics, and biology.
The difference between the Bayesian approach and Carnap's lies in the philosophical motivation, and in the different understanding of confirmation judgments: for Carnap, they are primarily a consequence of certain logical ways of carving the world at its joints; for the Bayesian, they express a genuinely subjective uncertainty judgment.
See also the entry on Bayes theorem. Can we ground the objectivity of scientific evidence in a framework that is explicitly based on personal attitudes? Bayesians have supplied several arguments to the effect that subjective probability is not equal to personal bias, which we will review in turn.
As argued by Howson and Howson and Urbach , the Bayesian's aim is not to determine an intersubjectively binding degree of confirmation, but to provide sound inference rules for learning from experience. In the same way that deductive logic does not judge the correctness of the premises but just advises you what to infer from them, Bayesian inductive logic tells you how to change your own attitudes as soon as you encounter evidence.
All other updating rules are susceptible to so-called Dutch books : betting based on following such rules will lead to sure monetary losses. In addition, convergence theorems guarantee that, as long as novel evidence keeps coming in, the degrees of belief of agents with very different initial attitudes will finally converge Gaifman and Snir However, one may object that the real problem does not lie with the internal soundness of the updating process, but with the choice of an appropriate prior, which may be beset with idiosyncratic bias and manifest social values.
Modern Bayesians prefer to measure degree of confirmation in terms of the increase in degree of belief that evidence E confers on hypothesis H , rather than the probability of H conditional on E. Several philosophers have argued that there is just one reasonable measure of confirmation as increase in degree of belief that satisfies a set of generally accepted desirable constraints e.
If one of these arguments were sound, then the incremental degree of confirmation would provide a bias-free assessment of the evidence. For solving applied problems, however, Bayesian statisticians almost uniformly use the Bayes factor , that is, the ratio of prior to posterior odds in favor of a hypothesis. The Bayesian approach can eliminate personal bias by imposing additional constraints on an agent's rational degrees of belief.
One way to do so consists in adopting the Principle of Maximum Entropy or MaxEnt, going back to Jaynes and developed philosophically by Jon Williamson Williamson retains the demand that degrees of belief satisfy the probability axioms, but dismisses the updating by conditionalization in equation 2.
Instead, he demands that the agent's degrees of belief must be in sync with empirical constraints and that, conditional on these constraints, they must be equivocal , that is, as middling as possible. This latter constraint amounts to maximizing the entropy of the probability distribution in question.